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Harald Uhlig more benign interpretation-recently put forth by European Central Bank (ECB) president Trichet in a speech, "Activism and alertness in monetary policy," in Madrid 2006-argues that instead it is the ECB holding the steering wheel steady, while the monetary policy pursued by the Fed is just erratic.
The second interpretation is that the shocks simply have been different. For example, growth in the United States was considerably higher in the second half of the 1990s, giving rise to fear of "overheating" there and thereby possibly necessitating policy interventions, which then needed to be reversed, as the U.S. economy spun into a recession. While the decline in growth rates in EMU may have been similarly large between 2000 and 2002, the growth rate only briefl y achieved U.S. levels in 2000 (see fi gure 9.2).
The third interpretation is that the structure of the economies are simply different. There are three striking differences in particular:
1. Labor markets are more rigid in Europe than in the United States. While one can point to some measures, the evidence here comes more from a variety of sources and qualitative measures, starting with labor market regulations and government interference in the labor market to union memberships and the role of unions in economic policy and the governance of fi rms.
2. The share of government is larger in Europe than it is in the United States. For the period from 1985 to 2005, mean government consumption to gross domestic product (GDP) was 16 percent in the United States and 20 percent in Europe. For government expenditure, the contrast was even more striking, with 32 percent in the United States versus 50 percent in Europe (see also fi gure 9.3). Furthermore, fi scal policy is arguably more decentralized in Europe, with Brussels playing a minor role vis-à-vis the nation states in Europe compared to the federal government vis-à-vis state and local governments in the United States.
3. A much larger share of business is bank-fi nanced rather than marketfi nanced in EMU, compared to the United States. For example, de Fiore and Uhlig (2006) document that the ratio of debt-to-equity is .41 in the United States and .61 in Europe. Furthermore, the ratio of bank-to-bond fi nance is 7.3 in the EMU and thus ten times as high as 0.74, the value for the United States.
It seems a priori plausible that these differences play a signifi cant factor in the explanations for monetary policy. For example, government spending tends to be rather smooth and acyclical: a larger share of government spending might therefore lessen the role of price rigidities for the private economy.
Recent advances in the modeling of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models-for example, Smets and Wouters (2003) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and related work-in particular have made it possible in principle to impose the key structural differences of the economy, estimate monetary policy reaction functions, and quantitatively account for the movements in key variables by a decomposition into the modelspecifi c structural shocks. This avenue is therefore well-suited for answering the question at hand.
These models are built on recent advances in investigating the role of sticky prices for the economy and the new-Keynesian paradigm (see, in particular, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler [1999] and Woodford [2003] ). Applying them directly to the task at hand poses three challenges, however.
1. Most of these models emphasize the role of sticky prices and the output gap in driving infl ation rates. Frictions from the interaction between fi nancial intermediation and monetary policy typically play no role or a role only insofar as they infl uence the output gap. This makes it challenging to address the third of the three key differences mentioned previously.
2. The distortionary role of nonmonetary economic policy typically plays a minor role. This makes it hard to address the fi rst and the second of the aforementioned key differences.
3. In quantitative applications and estimations, many observable time series are used. An equivalent number of shocks is then used in order to generate a regular one-step ahead variance-covariance matrix of the prediction errors. This makes it challenging to avoid pushing key dynamic features of the economy into "measurement errors" instead, which then receive a structural interpretation.
There is an earlier literature, emphasizing fi nancial frictions and the reallocational role of monetary injections. For example, Lucas and Stokey (1987) emphasize the role of cash for some of the transactions, while Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) emphasize credit contracts arising in the presence of asymmetric information. While the new-Keynesian approach in focusing on sticky prices may be appealing for a number of reasons, it is useful for the task at hand to bring lessons of that earlier literature into this framework.
There are important contributions in the literature on which I can draw for this task. In their seminal paper, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) (henceforth, CEE) impose a cash-in-advance constraint for fi rms to pay their wage bill. Firms borrow these funds from fi nancial intermediaries who in turn obtain funds from household deposits as well as central bank cash injection. While this feature of their paper seems there mostly to create some sort of money demand, it opens the possibility of studying fi nancial frictions further. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Altig et al. (2004) assume an additional cost for purchasing consumption goods, which depends on the velocity of the household's cash balances. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003) introduce a fairly rich banking sector, allowing for various monetary aggregates such as bank reserves and demand deposits, to study the role of money in the Great Depression. To keep the model tractable, yet allow for some potentially important avenues, I largely follow the lead of CEE. I additionally allow for a cash-inadvance constraint on consumption good purchases in order to judge the relative importance of private transactions to fi rm borrowing. I allow for the possibility that not all cash injections are permanent, but instead are taken out of the system again at the end of the period (which one might think of as a one-off reverse transaction). Finally, I explicitly account for the cost of borrowing in the profi t maximization problem and price setting problem of the fi rm, giving rise to an interest rate cost channel (see also Barth and Ramey [2001] and Secchi and Gaiotti [2006] ). This is a modest contribution to solving the fi rst of the three challenges listed previously.
I will explicitly allow for distortionary taxation of labor income, used to fi nance a stock of government as well as a certain level of government expenditure. I view this as a beginning to make progress on the second challenge. Certainly, several-although not all-monetary policy models of recent vintage have allowed for such infl uence of nonmonetary policy: this model is in the same tradition. In particular, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) add distortionary income taxation to CEE.
For the third challenge, I use Dynare and thus off-the-shelves estimation techniques, and discuss some issues arising from mapping the dynamics into the dynamics for few observable series only, employing the "ABCD" framework of Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2007) . In particular, I will focus on a small set of observable variables, judiciously chosen, and allow for as many shocks as there are variables. It will turn out that one needs to be careful. It is not just enough to insure an invertible mapping from the shocks to the innovations of the variables, but furthermore, it is important to check invertibility of the Value at Risk (VAR) representation itself. We do this by "visually" inspecting the VAR coefficients in the derived representation (see section 9.4).
In sum, the model can perhaps best be described as a variant of the CEE model, with the following deviations:
1. The costs of adjusting the capital stock arise from the investment-tocapital ratio, not the investment-to-previous-investment ratio.
2. There is a cash-in-advance constraint for household consumption purchases.
3. Only a fraction of the cash injections, which "liquify" the loan market for fi rms, may permanently increase the money supply.
4. The interest rate costs for borrowing part of the input bill explicitly arises in the objective function of the intermediate good fi rms.
5. Capital utilization is constant. 6. There is a distortionary tax on wage income and fi rm profi ts. There is government debt.
7. There is no indexation. 8. There is real wage sluggishness, following Blanchard and Galí (2005) . 9. Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule. 10. There are six shocks: a productivity shock, an investment-specifi c shock, a wage setting shock, a monetary policy shock and two fi scal policy shocks, a tax rate shock, and a spending shock. For estimation, I only "turn on" the tax rate shock.
11. Estimation is in terms of fi ve variables, inverting for the shocks per the recursive law of motion.
The approach of this chapter (as well as the results) share many similarities with the two slightly earlier papers by Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) . Sahuc and Smets (2008, 507) likewise come to the "overall conclusion [. . .] that differences in the size and the persistence of the shocks hitting the two economies is the main driving force behind the different interest rate behaviour." Their model differs from mine in several dimensions. Most notably, perhaps, there is no role for fi scal policy and hardly a role for differences in the fi nancial structure in their paper. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) also share the view with this chapter that "the U.S. economy was aided during the most severe phase of the [2001] recession by favourable productivity shocks, which [ . . . ] helped keep infl ation in check. By contrast, the slowdown in the Euro Area was exacerbated by negative productivity forces which also prevented infl ation from ebbing" (5). These authors furthermore emphasize the greater persistence of ECB policy compared to Fed policy. This is in some contrast to our fi ndings: while, for example, monetary policy shocks are more persistent in the EMU than the United States according to our fi ndings, interest rates are not.
The model by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) features a much more detailed entrepreneurial sector as well as more details on the banking sector, and therefore makes more progress than this chapter in its ability to address the differences in fi nancial structure between the United States and Europe. There is no role for fi scal policy in their paper, though. Their model is driven by fi fteen shocks, whereas my model features only fi ve. The costs of adjusting capital in their model are determined by the change in investment, whereas it is determined (more classically) by the ratio of investment to capital here.
These two papers therefore complement the investigation here. Despite a number of modeling differences they come to fairly similar conclusions, which ought to provide additional trust in the conclusions drawn.
Section 9.2 explains the model. A technical appendix provides the details for the analysis of the model. Section 9.3 explains the estimation strategy and lists the parameters used for the comparison. Section 9.4 is devoted to the invertibility issue. Section 9.5 provides results. Section 9.6 discusses these results and offers some tentative conclusions.
The Model
The model is a combination of a cash-in-advance model and a Calvo sticky-price model, amended with a role for a government.
Time is discrete. There are identical households, who supply labor and enjoy fi nal consumption. They own all fi rms. They use cash for parts of their transactions. There is a competitive sector of fi nal goods producing fi rms. There is a unit interval of monopolistic intermediate good fi rms, using labor to produce output and setting sticky prices. They need to borrow a fraction of their input bill from commercial banks. Commercial banks take deposits from households and receive cash injections from the central bank. They lend to intermediate goods fi rms. The central bank injects cash and thereby sets the nominal interest rate. The government taxes wage income and uses it to fi nance government purchases as well as debt repayments. Nominal wages are sluggish on the aggregate level.
A period has four parts:
1. Shocks are realized. The new nominal wage for the period is set. The central bank injects cash ⌿ t to banks.
2. A fraction of intermediate good fi rms is chosen to reset its price. Intermediate good fi rms "guess" demand and produce accordingly, hiring labor at the market wage. They are assumed to be required to borrow a fi xed fraction of the input bill from banks.
3. Households shop, using cash at hand as well. Government shops, using tax receipts as well as a short-term credit line from the central bank.
4. Financial markets open. Firms pay capital rental payments and wages to households. Firms pay interest to banks. They pay profi ts to households. Households pay taxes to the government. The government issues new bonds and repays old bonds. The household splits the remaining cash into deposits with banks and cash-at-hand for the next period.
Households
Households enjoy fi nal consumption c t and dislike labor n t according to
where 0 Յ Ͻ 1 is a habit parameter and 1/ Ͼ 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Households enter period t, holding deposits D t-1 at fi nancial intermediaries and cash-at-hand H t-1 . In the second part of the period, they supply labor n t according to demand at the market wage W t . In the third part, they use cash-at-hand to shop for a fraction of consumption, Lucas and Stokey (1987) , but that these cash and credit goods are purchased in fi xed proportion for consumption, and that investment goods are always credit goods. 1 The latter would be implied by a Leontieff specifi cation for the preferences in cash and credit goods. In principle, the household may spend less cash than available. However, I shall assume that shocks and parameters are such that the constraint on residual cash is binding, H t,res ϭ 0.
In the fourth part of the period, households receive after-tax nominal wages and trade all contingent claims, as well as fi rm shares and government bonds, and pay for the remaining (1 -) share of their purchases ("credit goods"). Netting out all household-to-household trades, the fi nancial market budget constraint is
where H t is cash-at-hand for the next period, D t is deposited with banks, q t is the discount price for government bonds B t , 1 ϩ i t is the return paid by banks on deposits D t-1 , P t r t is the nominal rental rate for capital, V t is the value added of intermediate good fi rms, and B t-1 are the debt repayments by the government.
One can extend this budget constraint with between-household trades. In particular, let Λ t,tϩk be the discount price on the fi nancial market at t for an extra unit of cash on the fi nancial market at date t ϩ k.
Also, households produce new capital subject according to
where the adjustment cost function ϕ(и) satisfi es
for some ϖ Ͼ 0 (see Jermann [1998] ), and where u x,t is a possibly persistent investment-specifi c disturbance,
following Fisher (2006) .
Final Good Firms
Final good fi rms take inputs y t,j to produce a fi nal good y t according to the production function
They purchase intermediate goods at price P t,i per unit and sell the fi nal good at price P t .
Intermediate Good Firms
Given a current intermediate goods price P t, j , intermediate good fi rms "guess" their demand y t, j resulting from the demand of fi nal good fi rms, see equation (62). They thus hire labor n t, j at nominal wages W t and rent capital k t, j at nominal rental rates P t r t to produce output according to
where ␥ t is an exogenous process for the change in technology and ⌽ is a parameter of the production function and might be thought of as a fi xed cost of production. Let ␥ t ϭ log(␥ t ) -log(␥ ෆ ) for some appropriate ␥ ෆ , and assume
I assume that the fi rm needs to obtain a loan L t,j for a fraction ξ t of the input bill, on which a nominal market interest rate i t needs to be paid. The rest of the input bill is paid for per trade credit (or more efficient market instruments) to be settled at the end of the period, on which no interest needs to be paid. That is, let MC t be the nominal marginal costs of producing an extra unit of output, excluding the additional costs of borrowing (see equation [54] ). Then, L t, j ϭ ξMC t y t, j and the value added of this fi rm (or, equivalently, end-of-period profi ts) are
Firms get to reoptimize prices with probability 1 -␣, independently of their past. If they cannot reoptimize prices, they will be adjusted at the average infl ation rate; that is,
When given a chance to reoptimize prices, they will choose it so as to maximize discounted value added along the no-optimization-of-prices path
where Λ t,tϩk is the market price at date t for an extra unit of cash at date t ϩ k on the fi nancial markets in part four of the period.
Commercial Banks
Banks compete for deposits from households and can borrow from the central bank. They then compete for giving loans to fi rms. Banks collect the returns on their loans in the fourth part of the period, and then repay households as well as the central bank. In equilibrium, banks make zero profi ts. Thus, there will be a market nominal rate of return i t on loans, deposits, and central bank money.
The Central Bank
The central bank provides cash ⌿ t into the economy via providing loans to the commercial banks at the nominal interest rate i t . It may be best to think of this as open market operations. The interest earnings on this open market operation constitute seignorage. Additionally, the central bank declares a fraction of the cash injection to be seignorage, not to be taken out of the system after repayment by the commercial banks. Thus, the government receives a central bank profi t transfer of ( ϩ i t )⌿ t in part four of the period.
Note that only ⌿ t , but not the interest earnings on the cash injection (or even the entire cash injection) constitute an increase in the money supply,
The parameter allows the distinction between a short-run liquidity injection and a long-run increase in money supply. If ϭ 0, liquidity is provided only temporarily, and taken out of the economy after the injection. Seignorage is then given only by the interest earned on the short-term injection. By contrast, ϭ 1 means that any short-term injection also increases money supply in the long run.
Recall that the output gap is defi ned as the difference between actual output and the output that would emerge in the absence of sticky prices and absence of stickiness in wages; that is, for ␣ ϭ 0 and ϭ 1, but keeping the friction of borrowing from banks. In an economy without sticky prices and sticky wages and without the need to borrow from banks, real marginal costs will be constant. The percent deviation of actual real marginal costs (13) mc t ϭ MC t ᎏ P t from its steady-state level can therefore serve as a proxy for the output gap. I therefore assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule in setting interest rates, using this ratio that
is infl ation, where is the infl ation target, i ෆ is the steady-state nominal rate, ζ and ζ x are coefficients of the policy rule, and where
is a possibly persistent distortion to the Taylor rule, driven by the monetary policy shock ε i,t .
The Government
The budget constraint of the government at the end of the period is given by
The government does not carry cash from one period to the next. However, the government is assumed to fi nance its purchases within the period via a short-term credit from the central bank. Thus, government spending P t g t is akin to a short-term cash injection on the demand side. This is consistent with the view that the central bank acts as the "checking account" bank to the government. Note that I do not allow the government to borrow from the central bank in the long term. Defi ne real debt
as well as real wages
I assume that the government aims at some steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio b ෆ/ y ෆ , as well as some steady-state level government-spending-to-GDP ratio g ෆ / y ෆ . Given all other parameters, let ෆ be the steady-state tax rate on wage income consistent with these targets.
I assume that the government follows the policy rule of adjusting future tax and spending plans, if the current debt level b t deviates from its target level b ෆ,
where ζ Ն 0 and ζ g Յ 0 such that the dynamics of government debt remains stable, and where both equations are driven by possibly persistent distortions
driven by the fi scal tax shock ε ,t and the fi scal spending shock ε g,t .
9.2.7 Labor Markets and Wage Setting I assume that wages move sluggishly on the aggregate level. A common form to generate nominal wage sluggishness is to assume Calvo wage stickiness for wage setters (see Erceg, Henderson, and Levin [2000] ). A different literature has emphasized frictions or sluggishness stemming from bargaining as the route cause (see Shimer [2005] or Hall [2005] ), giving direct rise to real wage sluggishness. The form I use here has been adapted from Blanchard and Galí (2005) and has been used, for example, in Uhlig (2007) .
More specifi cally, let W t, f be the wage emerging from the fi rst-order condition of the households' maximization problem. I assume that
for some Υ Ͼ 1 and a possibly persistent stochastic distortion (27) u w,t ϭ w u w,tϪ1 ϩ ε w,t .
An alternative interpretation of the distortion u w,t is to view it as being driven by fl uctuations in the preference parameter A, manifested in stochastic fl uctuations of the market-clearing wage W t, f . This perspective may be a reasonable shortcut in order to account for the fl uctuations in female labor supply, for example. Assuming moderate-size fl uctuations, actual wages will exceed the wage stemming from the fi rst-order condition, W t Ͼ W t, f , and thus, labor markets will be demand constrained. That is, I assume that households always supply labor at the going wage. Note that (26) can be rewritten in terms of real wages as
where
9.2.8 Aggregation and Market Clearing 1. Money market: Post-injection money supply equals end-of-period money demand. This is given by
Final goods market:
(30) g t ϩ c t ϩ x t ϭ y t .
Labor market:
(31)
Capital market:
(32)
Loan market:
(33)
Equilibrium and Solution
An equilibrium is an allocation, policy parameters and prices (including returns and profi ts) such that 1. The allocation solves the problem of the representative household, given prices and policy parameters.
2. The allocation solves the fi rms maximization problems, given prices and policy parameters.
3. The constraints for the government and the central bank hold. 4. Markets clear.
To solve for the equilibrium, I characterize the fi rst-order conditions, explicitly solve for the steady state, and characterize the dynamics per loglinearization around the steady state. I then compute the recursive law of motion solving these log-linearized equations. Details are available in a technical appendix.
Data and Estimation
I assume that u g,t ϵ 0; that is, I assume that there are no fi scal spending shocks. This is reasonable in light of the smoothness 3 in fi gure 9.3. There are fi ve shocks in the model: I therefore need observations on fi ve time series to solve for these shocks:
1. Infl ation, t . I calculate it using the GDP defl ator, since I am using real GDP in some other measures. A popular alternative is to use the consumer price index (CPI).
2. The central bank interest rate or short rate, i t . 3. Labor productivity, y t / n t . For y t , I use real GDP. For n t , I use employment rather than hours worked. In a boom, more part-time labor will be hired, but also, more "uncounted" hours are worked by employees: thus, it may be that employment rather than hours is a more reasonable variable to measure fl uctuations in labor input. It was also the series that was more easily available.
4. The consumption-to-GDP ratio, c t / y t . Cochrane (1994) in particular has shown that this ratio has predictive power for GDP growth and a number of other variables. Theory implies that this statistic indeed provides key information, so it is included here.
5. The debt-to-GDP ratio, b t / y t .
For the EMU, the data has been obtained from the ECB, and is in use for the area-wide model. For the United States, the data has been obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For debt, I have used the series GFDEBTN; that is, debt on the federal level.
I have used quarterly data from 1985 to 2005, striking a compromise between getting a reasonably long time span for data and relying on a reasonably stable monetary policy environment. While EMU only exists since 1999, one might argue that the Bundesbank has effectively played the role of a European central bank in the time before.
I am comparing the model in its log-linearized version-that is, in terms of log-deviations from the steady state-to the data. I therefore take logs of all variables, and removed the means. The resulting fi ve time series used in estimation can therefore be seen in fi gure 9.4. In particular, I have linearly Fig. 9 .4 Data used for estimation detrended labor productivity. If there is a constant time trend in ␥ t , it is fairly straightforward to correct all equations for it: essentially, this amounts to a slight correction in the discount rate. If the time trend is stochastic, the correction would imply a different set of equations, comparing everything to the current level of productivity. Since I log-linearized the model around a steady state with constant productivity, the linear detrending method is therefore more compatible with the theory.
The linearized model has been estimated using Dynare. In so doing, I have fi xed a number of parameters, and estimated others. A list is given in tables 9.1 and 9.2.
For the parameters fi xed a priori, I have set n ෆ ϭ 1, backing out the preference parameter A, rather than vice versa. In order to capture the different importance of banking in Europe versus the United States, I have fi xed ξ ϭ 0.5 for Europe, and ξ ϭ 0.1 for the United States. A good calibration for these numbers would be sensible: the results here instead should be taken as indicative for what would happen for reasonable, although perhaps not sufficiently carefully calibrated, values for these parameters. The factor fi ve was chosen to roughly refl ect the approximately fi vefold fi nancing of fi rms through banks (rather than capital market instruments and stocks) in Europe compared to the United States. I have used 1 for the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. All the other parameters are fairly standard.
For the estimated parameters, I have chosen rather uninformative priors. For parameters that should sensibly be in the unit interval, I used a uniform distribution, or, equivalently, a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and a standard deviation of 1/ ͙12 ෆ ϭ 0.29. For parameters that ought to be positive, I have used an inverted gamma distribution with infi nite variance. I have used a normal distribution centered at zero and a standard deviation of 1 for ζ g , which is certainly wide.
A, B, C, and D's of VARs
When estimating a model with just a subset of variables, the issue of invertibility may be of concern. Invertibility may matter even more for recovering the sequence of shocks explaining the observations. I use the ABCD framework of Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2007) to investigate the issue: the name of their paper has inspired the choice of the title for this subsection.
Let x t be the list of log-deviations from steady state for all variables in the economy, including the exogenous disturbances u i,t , and so forth. Let y t be a list of observable variables, and let ε t be the vector of i.i.d. shocks driving the system. Solving the linearized model with, for example, the methods exposited in Uhlig (1999) , provides a recursive law of motion (34) x t ϭ Ax tϪ1 ϩ Bε t (35) y t ϭ Cx tϪ1 ϩ Dε t . Assume that D is square and invertible, and that the eigenvalues of (A -BD -1 C) are strictly less than one in modulus. Fernandez-Villaverde, RubioRamirez, and Sargent (2007) show that
is an (infi nite-order) vector autoregression for y t , and that Dε t are the onestep ahead forecasts for y t . Let
be a fi nite-order approximation to the infi nite-order VAR in (36), defi ning the approximation error ϑ k,t . Given a recursive law of motion as in (34) and (35), and assuming D to be square and invertible, it is always possible to calculate the fi nite-order approximation (37). In practice, one would drop ϑ k,t from this equation, hoping that it is small. Equation (37) then provides for a convenient procedure to recover the residuals ε t driving the data. But ϑ k,t may not be small, either, because the eigenvalues of (A -BD -1 C) are not strictly less than one in modulus, or because they are only just below one, with the coefficients in (36) only gradually dying out with increasing lag length. The latter is the problem emphasized by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) .
It may thus be useful to examine how fast the coefficients in (37) die out at a specifi c parameterization of the model. Grouping the coefficients together according to lag length, I do this in fi gure 9.5 for the coefficient specifi cations 
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following for the United States and EMU. Note that the VAR coefficients die out quite fast.
Results
Estimates
The results of the estimation are provided in table 9.3. The results are taken directly from Dynare, using standard settings. While some of the confidence intervals are perhaps too tight-most likely pointing to yet insufficient sampling-the estimates all appear to be reasonable.
Taking these estimates at face value, there are some interesting differences as well as similarities in the comparison of the United States to EMU. Surprisingly, according to these estimates, wages actually appear to be more fl exible and less sluggish in the EMU rather than the United States, with ϭ 0.18 and w ϭ 0.88 there, as opposed to ϭ 0.06 and w ϭ 0.686 in the EMU. Less surprisingly, prices appear to be more sticky in EMU with ␣ ϭ 0.778 than the United States, with ␣ ϭ 0.668. Productivity (or, for the United States, the productivity disturbance), tax disturbances, and investmentspecifi c disturbances are all essentially random walks. The fraction of cash required for consumption transactions is about one-third in EMU and about one-half in the United States. Monetary injections seem to be temporary in the United States, ϭ 0.27, but permanent in Europe, ϭ 0.981. Interest rates show a persistence of i,L ϭ 0.289: one-third in EMU and about three-quarters in the United States: if anything, interest rate choices appear to be more sluggish in the United States. The Taylor rule coefficients are about 1.2 on infl ation and 0.2 on markup in the EMU, which is reasonable. They are slightly lower for infl ation and slightly higher on markup for the United States.
The feedback coefficients for fi scal policy differ in an interesting way. In response to a higher debt burden, the United States moderately raises taxes, ζ ϭ 0.18, and cuts spending, ζ g ϭ -0.058, while the Europeans actually increase spending, ζ g ϭ 0.079, and fi nance it by raising taxes even more, ζ ϭ 0.356.
Monetary policy shocks, tax shocks, and wage shocks show considerably larger standard deviations in the United States than in EMU.
As a postscriptum, the estimation results and therefore the conclusions based on them should be viewed with a considerable degree of caution. Note that the parameters are estimated rather indirectly: identifi cation is achieved through their impact on the dynamics of the whole system, rather than some more direct consequence. It is likely that misspecifi cation of the model can easily thwart the attempt to draw reasonable inference here: investigating that issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Even with the route taken here, it turns out that the model and its estimation appear to be quite sensitive, in particular with respect to the parameters ξ, as well as the fi scal policy parameters g ෆ / y ෆ , ζ , ζ g . For example, it is fairly easy to fi nd parameter combinations where Dynare delivers nonsensical results or complains about violations of the Blanchard-Kahn condition for the prior, while it is still possible to calculate solutions with my "toolkit": as an example, take ξ ϭ 1, g ෆ / y ෆ ϭ 0.35, ζ ϭ 1, ζ g ϭ 0, and otherwise taking prior means for all other variables. For some other parameter settings, one obtains warnings about badly scaled matrices and difficulties in starting the Markov chain. It is also not unusual that the posterior maximization procedure encounters a cliff shortly before it declare the maximum to be reached. This is true in particular for the estimation of the U.S. model, possibly explaining the unplausibly tight confi dence bands for several parameters. The estimation results can also depend quite substantially on g ෆ / y ෆ and ξ, which have been fi xed a priori. In sum, either the model or the estimation procedure is ill-behaved in certain aspects. Exploring these sensitivities and the reasons further would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this chapter.
Impulse Responses
To understand the properties of the model, I have calculated the impulse responses to shocks 1 percent in size, with the estimated parameters set at the posterior means rounded to two digits. Figure 9 .6 shows the impulse response of the nominal interest rate. Figure 9 .7 shows the response of out- Fig. 9 .6 Impulse responses of interest rates 510 Harald Uhlig put and fi gure 9.8 shows the response of infl ation. A technical appendix also shows the impulse responses of the remaining variables used for estimating the model; that is, labor productivity, the consumption-to-output ratio, and the debt-to-output ratio.
In these fi gures, I have also considered two "intermediate" parameterizations to judge the contribution of two features in particular: the higher (assumed) requirement for bank lending in the EMU parameterization, and the parameterization of the labor market with and w . Starting from the U.S. parameterization, I have fi rst only changed the parameter ξ from 0.2
Fig. 9.7 Impulse responses of interest rates
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It turns out that the banking requirement ξ matters only for a few key responses and variables. For example, the response of nominal interest rates as well as infl ation to investment disturbances moves sizably, when changing ξ. The change in labor market parameters matters in particular in the response of infl ation to monetary policy shocks-which becomes less pronounced in the United States, if using EMU labor market parameters-as well as the reaction to wage disturbances of all three variables.
Note also that the difference in the monetary policy reaction function in Fig. 9 .8 Impulse responses of interest rates EMU compared to the United States shows, if anything, a more pronounced reaction to shocks one standard deviation in size, which then is counterbalanced by the fact that these shocks appear to be smaller. The shape and thus the speed of the reaction looks similar across both regions. That is, by and large, the EMU monetary policy reaction function looks like the U.S. monetary policy reaction function, scaled up a bit, perhaps by a factor of two. This is inconsistent with the view that monetary policy in EMU is sklerotic or that it is indecisive decision-making by a committee of monetary policy makers in Europe.
Answering the Question
Equipped with these tools, I can fi nally provide an answer to the question with which this chapter started out. The answer is provided 4 graphically in fi gure 9.9. Note that all fi gures there have been drawn on the same scale for comparison. This fi gure decomposes the surprise movements in the United States and the EMU into the fi ve shocks, and adds up their contributions to the cumulative forecast error, compared to the no-shock prediction in 1998. That is, the sequence of shocks, shown in fi gure 9.10, give rise to impulse responses of the short-term interest rate or central bank interest rate: these impulse responses are cumulated at each point in time, for all present and past shocks (back to 1998) shown.
It turns out that three main sources of the movements come from technology shocks, from monetary policy shocks, and fi nally, from wage shocks. Interestingly, the monetary policy shocks provide a fairly similar pattern for both Europe and the United States. The top right-hand plot in fi gure 9.9 shows that monetary policy was tighter in both the United States and EMU in 2000, but considerably looser in 2004, than can be explained by all other variables and historical experience. If one views these shocks as policy mistakes, one would conclude that pretty much the same mistakes have been made in both regions, and that, if anything, the Fed seemed to follow the ECB rather than the other way around.
Surprise movements in productivity provide for a key difference between the United States and EMU. Note that movements in labor productivity in the new millenium were sharply different in the United States and in EMU, as evidenced by the left fi gure in the second row of fi gure 9.4. Figure 9 .6 shows that monetary policy reacts to surprise rises in productivity and thus the surprise fall in marginal costs by lowering interest rates, see the top left panel. The central bank can afford to do so, since infl ation is falling anyhow, as a result, see the top left panel in fi gure 9.8. Together, it then may no longer surprise that the productivity movements in this millenium led to a consid-erable downward drift of interest rates in the United States, but upward pressure in the EMU (see the top left panel in fi gure 9.9).
The main additional difference then arises due to surprise wage movements. In the United States, they have contributed to raising interest rates before 2000 and after 2004, with the opposite movements in the EMU (see the bottom panel in fi gure 9.9).
While the reaction function of U.S. and EMU monetary policy to both wage shocks and productivity shocks differ quantitatively (see fi gure 9.6), they do not differ qualitatively. The differences in the interest rate movements in fi gure 9.9 arises due to different shocks, actually almost moving in oppositive direction for both variables. In sum, it appears that the difference between the two monetary policies seen in fi gure 9.1 is due to both surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands, moving interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the United States, but not due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or to different monetary policy surprises. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The conclusion from this quantitative exercise appears to be that the difference between the two monetary policies seen in fi gure 9.1 is due to both surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands, moving interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the United States, but not due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or to different monetary policy surprises. If anything, it appears that monetary policy in EMU reacts more strongly to shocks, when they appear.
But a number of words of caution are in order. First, these conclusions hinge on a particular choice of shocks propagating in the economy. There is a trade-off between missing an important disturbance as explanation versus adding spurious shocks and thus risking to misinterpret important economic dynamics as movements in these spurious disturbances instead.
Second, the conclusions hinge on the particular model chosen. Is there any sense that they are correct across a wide range of models or approaches? The model may be faulty in a number of crucial features, or improve on these features compared to other models. How are we to judge this? Acknowledging misspecifi cation of the theory and seeking robust approaches to answer the key question may be a way to proceed further (see, e.g., Hansen and Sargent 2001) .
Third, while the chapter has provided an accounting method for explaining the different interest paths in the United States and the EMU, it has not asked whether this difference is, in fact, optimal or what the optimal reaction function should have been. That is, it may be the case that U.S. monetary policy has behaved badly and EMU monetary policy has done the right thing, or the other way around. The previous analysis has not addressed this issue all. The tools for pursuing this question are provided in, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004, 2005) or Levin et al. (2006) . One could even combine the perspective of optimality with the acknowledgment of misspecifi cation and a desire for robustness (see, e.g., Levin and Williams 2003) .
At the end of the day, there appears to be little else than delivering quantitative answers, based on thoughtfully chosen assumptions. This chapter hopes to make a contribution to that end. Along its novel features it has provided a possibility for considering traditional lending channels of monetary policy alongside the sticky-price perspective pursued by the more recent new-Keynesian literature. To that end, a hybrid new-Keynesian cash in advance model has been provided, estimated, and used to quantitatively answer the question at hand. Some progress has been made. But much more needs to be done.
Technical Appendix Analysis
First-Order Conditions
Households
Households solve
Let t be the Lagrange multiplier on the fi rst constraint (38), t on the second constraint (39), and ς t the Lagrange multiplier on the third constraint (40). Note that
would therefore be the Lagrange multiplier on the second constraint written in nominal terms. Therefore,
The fi rst-order conditions are
(1 ϩ u x,tϩ1 )ϕЈ
Also note that the fi rst-order condition with respect to labor determines the target real wage w t, f ,
Final Good Firms
Maximizing profi ts
subject to the production function (6) results in the demand function
and the price aggregation
Intermediate Good Firms
Cost minimization leads to the nominal marginal costs of producing an extra unit of output, Therefore, the capital-labor ratio k t, j / n t, j is the same across all fi rms, and equal to the aggregate ratio k t-1 / n t . Aggregating (55) and (56) (57) and (54) imply the more intuitive equation
To calculate the aggregate production function, observe that
, and where (S t / P t ) (1ϩ)/ can be thought of as a correction of the Solow residual due to sticky prices. This correction is known to disappear in a fi rst-order log-linear approximation (see also [123] ), but it may be relevant in higherorder approximations.
When a fi rm can reoptimize its price P t * ϭ P t,j , it seeks to maximize the objective (11), taking into account the dependence of demand on its chosen price in future dates, if prices cannot be reoptimized, and taking into account the costs of borrowing from banks,
This problem can be rewritten as (62) max
The fi rst-order condition becomes-as usual (or with some calculation)- Aggregating, and equalizing to available funds yields in real terms
, which I shall use instead of (33).
Parameters
The fundamental parameters are
and the variance of the technology shock and investment-specifi c shock. The parameters for prices, wages, and credit markets are ϒ, ␣, , ξ, w , , and the variance of the wage shock. The policy parameters are
as well as the feedback coefficients
and variances of the policy shocks.
Collecting the Equations
The equations characterizing the equilibrium are (HH: "household"; "FG": fi nal good fi rms; "IG": intermediate good fi rms; "CB": central bank; "GOV": government; "MC": labor market and market clearing): Note that these are 34 equations for 33 variables. One may drop either the household budget constraint, the government budget constraint, or one of the market-clearing conditions, due to Walras' law.
Steady State
Household
To calculate the steady state, and since my focus is not on a steady-state comparison across various parameters, I assume a value for n ෆ and instead back out the compatible preference parameter A. The capital accumulation equation (69) implies (101) x ෆ ϭ ␦k ෆ.
The fi rst-order conditions (71) and (74) of the households imply
For the rental rate of capital, the fi rst-order condition (75) implies
The fi rst-order conditions (72) and (73) imply
Firms
We shall assume that the parameters imply v ෆ Ͼ 0. Equations (78), (79), and (94) deliver P ෆ t * ϭ S ෆ t ϭ P ෆ t ϭ ෆ P ෆ tϪ1 .
With equation (77),
Hence, r t , t , and iˆt are in percent, ĝ t and b t are in percent of steady-state output, and t is in percent of the steady-state money supply. Most equations can be log-linearized in a straightforward manner, but some equations require a bit more thought. They are explained now.
Pricing Decisions
The following derivation is standard in the literature on new-Keynesian models and is replicated here for completeness.
Equations (78) and (79) log-linearize to (121) P t ϭ (1 Ϫ ␣)P t * ϩ ␣P tϪ1 Ŝ t ϭ (1 Ϫ ␣)P t * ϩ ␣Ŝ tϪ1 and thus (122) Ŝ t ϭ P t .
This substantiates the claim that the correction to the Solow residual in (59) vanishes in a fi rst-order approximation. The fi rst-order condition (83) of the intermediate good fi rms log-linearizes to
A rather "pedestrian" but fail-safe way to see this is to indeed replace all variables, say x tϩk , with their log-linearized counterpart x(1 ϩ x tϩk ), drop all products of hat-variables as "higher order" (or better, do not write them down-there are many). Simplify the constants, employing equation (106). A slightly more sophisticated approach is to immediately log-linearize products, say x t y t z t to xyz(1 ϩ x t ϩ ŷ t ϩ ẑ t ).
The previous equation can be rewritten as (124) P t * ϭ (1 Ϫ ␣␤)
From equation (122), substitute P t * and P * tϩ1 per
Combine terms to obtain the new-Keynesian Phillips curve 
